Footage taken near Sinkivka, Kharkiv Oblast. According to the source, the Russians had recently launched an unsuccessful assault with infantry and armor. The assault recorded in this video was conducted with infantry alone, ostensibly to save more armor from destruction. The Russian infantry step off from their assault position and cross the line of departure, crossing an open area and seeking cover in a cluster of trees which are immediately targeted by Ukrainian artillery. It is likely that the woods were identified and registered as targets long before the Russian assault began. The artillery, likely 155mm, makes short work of this unit, and anyone left alive or uninjured in the trees is undoubtedly having a bad day.

Ukrainians refer to these unsupported infantry attacks as “meat assaults.” The Russians engaged in similar tactics earlier in the war, and the grinding push to take Bakhmut witnessed these costly tactics. Russian and Wagner units established Storm Z detachments, which advanced forward of the main body and drew fire from Ukrainian defenders. This served to identify Ukrainian strong points, which were then engaged by Russian heavy weapons and artillery. This costly approach is morally repugnant by western standards, and yet I can see how and why it yielded some results. What the Russians are doing in this footage lacks even the sophistication of former Russian efforts. This unit, committed without armor or artillery support, was thrown away without a thought in pursuit of tactical gains of marginal importance. I would say that it looks like throwing good money after bad, but that would imply that the Russians place some value on the lives of the soldiers they send into battle.

It is also worth noting what a departure this is from pre-war Russian doctrine. Following the 2008 Russian invasion of South Osetia, the army underwent a massive overhaul, resulting in a reorganization and the establishment of the battalion tactical group (BTG) as the core tactical maneuver element. This force structure was found wanting last year for several reasons. Most Russian units, even their VDV airborne and air assault divisions, are essentially mechanized infantry and are heavily dependent on vehicles with fewer infantry dismounts that is found in U.S. or NATO formations. Yet the events of last year proved that light infantry has value in modern warfare, and that vehicles are vulnerable without the support of infantry and fire support.

The second problem with the pre-war Russian force structure is that they lacked the command and control capabilities to employ it, or to execute combined arms operations above the battalion level. Issues with command structure, officer training, and communications limited the Russian Army’s ability to identify targets, to delivery timely and responsive fires, to coordinate maneuver with fires, and to synchronize the efforts of adjacent units. While the Russians have learned some lessons in the past year and have improved to some degree, the underlying lack of unity and cohesion remains. Synchronization between maneuver elements and fire support agencies is loose, at best, and adjacent units operate in the presence of each other rather than in a coordinated fashion. The result is that Russian soldiers are committed to battle in piecemeal fashion, and these “meat assaults” continue to bleed the Russian Army with little to show for it.

About the Author

Cam

Cam served as an infantry officer in the Marine Corps, deploying to the Horn of Africa and participating in combat operations in Iraq. He currently works in the maritime industry and in the defense sector as an instructor of combined arms planning and operations. An avid sailor, Cam founded and directs Triumph Sailing, a nonprofit that supports veterans and first responders through adventure and fellowship on the water. Triumph Sailing just completed its big yearly event, an offshore race in the Gulf of Mexico with an all veteran crew. You can support the mission and next year's sailing season at Tri-Sail.Org.